A Case For a Bill Recognizing Primary Assumption of Risk as Limiting Liability for Persons and Providers Who Take Part in Sports & Recreational Activities by VerSteeg, J. Russell
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 36 Issue 1 Article 2 
2013 
A Case For a Bill Recognizing Primary Assumption of Risk as 
Limiting Liability for Persons and Providers Who Take Part in 
Sports & Recreational Activities 
J. Russell VerSteeg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Russell VerSteeg, A Case For a Bill Recognizing Primary Assumption of Risk as Limiting Liability for 
Persons and Providers Who Take Part in Sports & Recreational Activities, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 57 
(2013). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
  57 
A CASE FOR A BILL RECOGNIZING PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK AS LIMITING LIABILITY FOR PERSONS AND PROVIDERS 
WHO TAKE PART IN SPORTS & RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
J. Russell VerSteeg
*
 
§ 1. Definitions 
1. A “sport or recreational activity” encompasses all commonly under-
stood sports and recreational and/or adventure activities of any kind, 
whether or not those activities include an instructional, educational, or 
competitive component, including but not limited to: alpine sports and/or 
activities (including skiing, ski-biking, and snowboarding), animal rid-
ing, animal training, archery, ballooning, backcountry trips, backpack-
ing, badminton, base jumping, baseball, basketball, biathlon, bicycling, 
billiards, bird-watching, boating activities, bowling, boxing, bungee 
jumping, camping, caving, challenge courses, cheerleading, cliff diving, 
climbing (including climbing observation towers, ice climbing, mountain 
climbing, and rock climbing, either indoors or outdoors on either natural 
or artificial surfaces), curling, cutting wood, dancing (including social, 
competitive, and fitness-related dance [e.g., jazzercise and Zumba], div-
ing, dude ranching, any equine activity and sports, exploring caves, ex-
treme sports, fishing, fitness training, football, geocaching, gliding, golf, 
gymnastics, hang gliding, harvesting the products of nature, hiking, 
hockey, horseback riding, horseshoe-pitching, hunting and gathering, ice 
skating, longboarding, martial arts, motorcycling, nature study, Nordic 
skiing, operating an all-terrain vehicle or utility terrain vehicle (including 
standard ATV’s and snowmobiles), outdoor education programs, paint-
ball, parachuting, participation in water or ski sports outside of designat-
ed areas, picnicking, ping pong, racing, racquetball, removing wood, riv-
er floating, rollerblading, roller skating, rugby, self-contained underwater 
breathing apparatus (SCUBA), sight-seeing, skating, sky diving, sleigh 
riding, sledding, snorkeling, snowboarding, snowmobiling, snowtubing, 
soccer, softball, spelunking, sport shooting, swimming, teambuilding ac-
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tivities, tennis, throwing darts, track and field sports (including all run-
ning, jumping, and throwing events [e.g., pole vault, high jump, javelin, 
long jump, shot put, marathoning, etc.]), trapping, trekking, triathlon, 
weight training, ultimate Frisbee, volleyball, walking (including walking 
for fitness or nature walks), white water rafting, wrestling, windsurfing, 
yoga, zip-lining, and any other sport, game, or educational activity. 
2. “Inherent risks in a sport or recreational activity” are those risks which 
are characteristic of, derivative of, an integral part of, ordinary to, or in-
trinsic to any given sport or recreational activity, including but not lim-
ited to the judgment, decision-making, conduct, ordinary carelessness 
(i.e., mere negligence), and/or gross negligence (i.e., negligence below 
the level of culpability of recklessness) of any person as defined below 
in § 1.3 or provider as defined below in § 1.4. 
3. A “person who takes part in a sport or recreational activity” includes, 
but is not limited to: participants and co-participants, coaches, officials, 
spectators, caddies, team staff personnel, classmates, chaperones, com-
petitors, drivers, facilities and/or field personnel, instructors, judges 
(whether on or off the field, ice, court, or other playing surface or area), 
mentors, organizers, providers, referees, umpires, sponsors, students, 
teammates, team members, team personnel, team staff, trainers, pit crew, 
venue employees, personnel, volunteers, vendors, players or participants 
in sports and recreational activities listed in or within the scope of §1.1. 
4. A “provider” includes but is not limited to both public and private: 
persons, individuals, organizations, clubs, schools, conferences, and cor-
porate entities that, for profit or otherwise, sponsor, organize, arrange, 
offer, provide a venue for, and/or conduct a sport or recreational activity. 
§ 2. Assumption of Risks Inherent in a Sport or Recreational Activi-
ty in General. A person, irrespective of his or her age, who takes part in 
a sport or recreational activity, assumes the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational activity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is 
legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or 
herself that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational ac-
tivity. 
§ 3. Assumption of Risks Inherent in a Sport or Recreational Activi-
ty as “Primary Assumption of Risk”. All assumption of inherent risks 
is “primary assumption of risk” which has the legal effect of negating 
duty for a sport or recreational activity. This negation of duty results 
from the nature of the sport or recreational activity and the parties’ rela-
tionship to it, because neither a provider nor a person who takes part in a 
sport or recreational activity owes a legal duty to protect other persons 
who take part in a sport or recreational activity from the inherent risks of 
a sport or recreational activity. 
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§ 4. Non-Inherent Risks Not Assumed in a Sport or Recreational Ac-
tivity. A person (as defined in § 1.3) does not assume risks of injury 
caused either by a provider of a sport or recreational activity or by a per-
son (as defined in §§ 1.3 and 1.4) which are not inherent (as defined in § 
1.2). Intentional or reckless conduct of a person and/or provider (as de-
fined in §§ 1.3 and 1.4) that is totally outside the range of ordinary activ-
ity involved in a sport or recreational activity is not an inherent risk of a 
sport or recreational activity. 
§ 5. Risks Inherent in a Sport or Recreational Activity: A Question 
of Law. The determination of whether a risk is an inherent risk in a sport 
or recreational activity, and consequently whether a duty is owed in a 
sport or recreational activity, is a question of law for the court, and there-
fore will generally be appropriate for resolution by a motion to dismiss, 
on summary judgment, and/or directed verdict. 
§ 6. Neither a Person Nor Provider is Required to Eliminate, Alter, 
or Control Inherent Risks. Neither a person nor provider is required to 
eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks within a sport or recreational 
activity. 
§ 7. Act Not Applicable to Equipment or Products. This Act does not 
apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of any 
sport or recreational equipment or other products used incidental to or 
required by a sport or recreational activity. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In our litigious society, we have grown accustomed to blaming others 
for our own misfortunes. It is surprising how common it is for people in-
jured while participating in sports and recreational activities to sue partici-
pants, coaches, spectators, officials, volunteers—even the very organizations 
that sponsor, fund, and produce the sport or recreational activity.1 Given this 
development, “[o]ne might well conclude that something is terribly wrong 
with a society in which the most commonly-accepted aspects of play—a 
traditional source of a community’s conviviality and cohesion—spurs litiga-
tion.”2 Those involved in sports and recreational activities sue even though 
they either know or have reason to know the risks that are simply inherent in 
 
 1. Terence J. Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes: Altering 
Obligations and Placing them on Participants, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 40–41 (2006) 
[hereinafter Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes] (“American 
sports participants experiencing a mishap are more likely to blame the sport provider for not 
implementing greater safety precautions . . . . American tort law encourages families of per-
sons who are injured to blame the facility and property owners.” (footnote omitted)). 
 2. Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 66 A.3d 1252, 1262 (2013) (quoting Crawn 
v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (1994)). 
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all sports and recreational activities. Some courts and state legislatures have 
dealt with the fact of this knowledge of inherent risks by adopting legal rules 
that refuse to impose tort liability for negligence in sports and recreational 
activities.3 Instead, these courts and legislatures impose tort liability in the 
context of sports and recreational activities only when injury occurs as a 
result of reckless or intentional conduct. “These provisions potentially re-
duce the number of accidents that will lead to successful lawsuits. In this 
manner, the statutes help facilitate participation in risky sport activities.”4 
This article explains the rationale for a specific kind of proposed legis-
lation: a uniform sport responsibility act. In short, this proposed legislation 
is intended to encourage Americans to participate in sports and recreational 
activities in a vigorous, robust, and energetic fashion, without undue con-
cern for liability.5 California and Ohio courts have led the way by adopting, 
through common law, the basics of the legal principles that serve as the 
foundation for the proposed legislation.6 For example, in Knight v. Jewett7 
 
 3. For a comprehensive listing of state statutory provisions, see John O. Spengler  
& Brian P. Burket, Sport Safety Statutes and Inherent Risk: A Comparison Study of Sport 
Specific Legislation, 11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 135, 136–57 (2001). See also id. 164–65 
(drawing conclusions about the legislation). 
 4. Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 57 
(footnote omitted). See also Terrence J. Centner, Tort Liability for Sports and Recreational 
Activities: Expanding Statutory Immunity for Protected Classes and Activities, 26 J. LEGIS. 1, 
3 (2000) [hereinafter Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity] (“[U]nder some of the legisla-
tive immunity provisions, an actor is immune from liability for negligent acts while remain-
ing liable for more egregious conduct.”) (footnote omitted). For an examination of liability 
issues related to exceptionally risky sports, see David Horton, Extreme Sports and Assump-
tion of Risk: A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 599 (2004). Horton, for example, notes: 
A growing number of personal injury litigants stand outside the contours of tort 
law. Plaintiffs who are hurt while engaging in high risk recreational activities do 
not fit within a doctrine that uses ‘reasonableness’ as its central criterion. Rea-
sonableness hinges on whether the cost of an untaken precaution outweighs that 
of a particular harm. In many risky sports, the only way to avoid getting hurt is to 
forego the activity altogether. 
Id. at 599 (footnote omitted). See also Denise M. Yerger, High-Risk Recreation: The Thrill 
That Creates a Statutory and Judicial Spectrum of Response and Drives the Dichotomy in 
Participant and Provider Liability, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 687, 688 (2005). 
 5. See Matthew G. Cole, No Blood No Foul: The Standard of Care in Texas Owed by 
Participants to One Another in Athletic Contests, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 441–42 (2007). 
 6. See TERENCE J. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE: POINTING FINGERS AND 
SHUNNING RESTITUTION 184 (2008) [hereinafter CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE] 
(“California has adopted a legal concept that attempts to stop litigation by persons who at-
tempt to blame others. It’s called the primary assumption of risk doctrine. It allows courts to 
dismiss cases involving sport participants blaming others when no duty exists.”) (footnote 
omitted); id. (“The California Supreme Court considered these issues and found that the 
player assumed the risks that accompany baseball. Because the player was voluntarily play-
ing the game, he assumed the inherent risks of the game, including being hit by a baseball.”). 
See also Yerger, supra note 4, at 694–97 (summarizing the California common law). 
 7. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
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the California Supreme Court noted: “The courts have concluded that vigor-
ous participation in . . . sporting events likely would be chilled if legal liabil-
ity were to be imposed on a participant on the basis of his or her ordinary 
careless conduct.”8 Ohio courts have stated the rule rather simply: “the Su-
preme Court of Ohio has generally held that ‘where injuries are sustained in 
a sporting event, there is no liability for injuries caused by negligent con-
duct.’”9 In addition, many individual states—Wyoming for example—have 
attempted, with varied success, to codify such a law.10 This article proposes 
a uniform state law (“the Bill”) and explains the content, language, and in-
tent of the Bill. Drawing on the experience of both case law and state sport 
responsibility statutes, the Bill attempts to blend the interpretations and 
teachings of courts, legislators, and commentators to fashion a sound uni-
form sport responsibility law.11 In doing so, the article and the Bill seek to 
clarify ambiguities and close loopholes that have given some state courts 
difficulty when interpreting the legal principles related to a comprehensive 
sport responsibility law. 
The purpose of the Bill is to create a statute that employs the legal 
principle of primary assumption of risk to remove from those participating 
in sports and recreational activities the legal duty to protect others from the 
risks that are inherent in such activities.12 A common law creation, “primary 
assumption of the risk is the judicially created affirmative defense whereby 
a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff against certain risks that are 
so inherent in an activity that they cannot be eliminated.”13 As Catherine 
Hansen-Stamp has explained: 
 
 8. Id. at 710. 
 9. Crace v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 
 10. See Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 
48–65 (discussing various types of statutes limiting liability, including Good Samaritan stat-
utes, ski statutes, equestrian immunity statutes, and sport responsibility statutes in general). 
For a general discussion of sport responsibility statutes, see Centner, Expanding Statutory 
Immunity, supra note 4, at 19–27. See also John O. Spengler, Brian P. Burket, Sport Safety 
Statutes and Inherent Risk: A Comparison Study of Sport Specific Legislation, 11 J. LEGAL 
ASPECTS SPORT 135, 136–57 (2001) (includes a comprehensive table of state sport responsi-
bility statutes). For a brief summary of Wyoming’s statute, see Yerger, supra note 4, at 697–
702. 
 11. See Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 
47 (“The need for tort liability exceptions has been recognized for hundreds of years.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Geurin v. Icepro, No. G042455, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 556 at *4 
(Jan. 25, 2011) (“The existence of a duty is not an immutable fact of nature, but rather an 
expression of policy considerations providing legal protection.”) (citation omitted). See also 
CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 144 (“Most sport responsibility 
statutes delineate a directive that participants cannot recover damages for injuries resulting 
from the inherent risks of the sport.”). 
 13. Bundschu v. Naffah, 768 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (citation omit-
ted). 
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[T]he application of the . . . [doctrine] requires a duty analysis: if the in-
jury results from an inherent risk, the provider owes no legal duty, plain-
tiff’s cause of action must fail . . . . If the injury does not result from an 
inherent risk, plaintiff may go on to prove that the provider’s negligence 
caused his injuries.
14
 
Primary assumption of risk holds those who participate in or provide 
sports and recreational activities liable for injury to others participating if 
and only if the injury is caused by reckless or intentional conduct, but not for 
mere negligence or even for what some describe as gross negligence.15 
A primary goal of the Bill is to reduce the volume of lawsuits brought 
by those participating in sports and recreational activities.16 Often a plain-
tiff’s insurer initiates such lawsuits because, if the insurer can convince a 
jury that someone else is to blame for the plaintiff’s injury, then that some-
one else (i.e., the defendant or the defendant’s insurer) must pay medical 
bills in order to compensate the injured participant. Admittedly, in most 
instances, when a serious injury occurs while participating in a sport or rec-
reational activity, someone must pay medical costs and other compensation. 
But it will be far more efficient for the injured participant (or, as will often 
be the case, the injured participant’s first-party medical insurer) to pay or 
absorb medical costs. The Bill creates a legal rule that will decrease the 
number of lawsuits brought by injured sports participants. One reason why 
there will be fewer lawsuits is because the Bill will reduce the likelihood 
that a plaintiff’s attorney will be willing to take a case on a contingency ba-
sis.17 This is so because in order to prevail, the plaintiff’s lawyer will have to 
prove that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from the defendant’s reckless or 
intentional conduct that was totally outside the range of ordinary activity 
involved in the sport or recreational activity in question. And it is decidedly 
more difficult to prove recklessness or intent than it is to prove either mere 
 
 14. Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming’s 
Recreational Safety Act – An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 249, 260 (1998) (footnote 
omitted) [hereinafter Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries]. 
 15. See infra Parts II and IV for more discussion about primary assumption of risk. 
 16. Many commentators and courts have recognized this as a legitimate goal of such a 
legal rule. See, e.g., Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra 
note 1, at 39 (“[T]his Article acknowledges policy-driven proposals, common law principles, 
and statutory solutions that have been offered to curtail tort litigation. . . . [T]his Article pro-
poses that future changes to the American tort system should model the success of equestrian 
immunity and sports responsibility statutes by enacting obligations on participants to reduce 
litigation and accompanying expenses.). 
 17. See Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 35 (“Moreover, as 
statutory parameters become understood, plaintiffs without a bona fide claim due to the im-
munity provided by a statute may be expected to be less likely to find an attorney willing to 
represent them in a lawsuit.”) (footnote omitted). 
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negligence or even gross negligence.18 As Professor Centner explains: “Alt-
hough most sport responsibility statutes do not prevent plaintiffs from bring-
ing a lawsuit, plaintiffs with injuries caused by inherent risks of the sport 
may be expected to not file suit because, under the statute, they cannot re-
cover their damages.”19 He adds, “the statutory directives stating that pro-
viders do not have a duty of care concerning inherent risks should lead some 
sport participants to forgo litigation concerning their injuries.”20 
In the absence of the legal rule proposed by the Bill, insurers are fre-
quently forced to defend negligence claims in situations where a sport or 
recreational activity participant has been injured in the ordinary course of 
participation, even though the risk that caused the injury was a risk inherent 
in the sport or recreational activity. “A legal system involving a low level of 
personal responsibility facilitates liability disputes.”21 Defending such law-
suits is expensive and wasteful.22 Some providers of sports and recreational 
activities have simply discontinued offering activities either out of fear of 
being sued or due to rising insurance costs.23 “The assignment of liability 
affects who must buy insurance to cover accidents and prices charged to 
participants. Under our legal principles, providers of risky activities must 
buy more insurance and increase participation fees to cover the costs of 
damages from accidents involving careless participants.”24 
At a time when many Americans bemoan the sedentary lifestyle of 
many of our youth, our laws should be encouraging—not discouraging those 
who provide sports and recreational activities.25 As Centner illustrates, 
“[o]ur tort system needs to allow normal childhood behavior without blam-
 
 18. See infra Part V.A. 
 19. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 35 (footnote omitted). 
 20. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 35. 
 21. Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 39–
40 (footnote omitted). 
 22. See CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 12 (“America’s legal 
rules governing tort lawsuits are costly for defendants and taxpayers. No wonder the legal 
system is so expensive. It involves a large number of lawsuits by individuals who fail to 
accept responsibility and who seek pecuniary gain.”). See also id. at 183 (“But what about all 
the wasted efforts involved with the litigation for the defendants, as well as the court system 
handling the motions, trial, and appeal? Is there a way to more clearly assign liability so that 
lawsuits do not require a trial?”). 
 23. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 84 (“Schools forgo new 
activities, or even cancel longstanding practices, due to liability concerns.”). See also Cent-
ner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 45–46. 
 24. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 162. 
 25. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 10, 84 (“Because of our tort 
system, Americans have exchanged scraped knees and broken arms for obese children who 
may be expected to have serious health problems when they are older. Americans would 
rather have kids sit indoors and search the internet than run around in their neighborhoods . . . 
. No wonder why our kids resort to playing video games and watching TV; most of the fun 
activities are banned because they are too dangerous.”). 
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ing others for every mishap.”26 The plaintiffs’ bar profits at the expense of 
those who participate in and provide sports and recreational activities and 
their insurers.27 Both plaintiffs and defendants in such lawsuits are forced to 
hire expert witnesses and pay their costly fees. Jurors, who understandably 
sympathize with injured athletes or spectators, more as a product of sympa-
thy rather than reason, are prone to find innocent defendants liable. Know-
ing the inclinations of jurors, defense counsel often settle these cases in an 
effort to avoid jury awards that can be astronomic. 
Part II of this Article expands upon the meaning of the doctrine of pri-
mary assumption of risk. Part III parses the key definitions of terms used in 
the Bill and provides interpretive details to explain the intent of those defini-
tions. Parts IV through VIII elaborate upon each substantive provision of the 
Bill, providing interpretations and accounts from courts and commentators 
in an effort to clarify potential ambiguities. The Conclusion restates the pur-
poses of the Bill in simple terms, and exhorts legislators to seriously consid-
er its adoption. 
II.  THE GENERAL RULE OF PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
§ 2 Assumption of Risks Inherent in a Sport or Recreational Activity 
In General 
A person, irrespective of his or her age, who takes part in a sport or rec-
reational activity, assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
activity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally re-
sponsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or herself 
that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational activity. 
“This primary assumption of risk doctrine provides generally that indi-
vidual participants assume the inherent risks of recreational activities and all 
liability or responsibility for injuries resulting from those risks. Alternative-
ly, providers of recreational activities have no duty to protect participants 
 
 26. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 158, 161 (“Parents deter-
mine whether their kids are mature enough to participate in sports such as ice hockey, skiing, 
or football. These parental decisions mean that parents have impliedly consented to their 
children’s activities . . . . Parents who decide to allow their kids to pursue a dangerous activi-
ty make a conscious choice in accepting risks of injury.”). 
 27. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 33 (“One of the major con-
cerns about the American litigation system is that it is costly. It is by far the most expensive 
in the world, costing about $250 billion per year. With a population of about 300 million, an 
average of $830 per year is spent on tort costs for every American. Many believe that attor-
neys’ fees are excessive, verdicts are too big, and that too much money is spent preparing for 
trial.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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from the inherent risks and dangers of recreational activities.”28 “The doc-
trine of primary assumption of risk is a shorthand way of saying that a de-
fendant owes no duty to protect plaintiffs from an activity’s inherent 
risks.”29 Section 2 of the Bill expressly adopts the reasoning articulated in 
and holdings of cases such as Knight v. Jewett,30 Crace v. Kent State Univer-
sity,31 and Kahn v. East Side Union High School District.32  For example, in 
Crace v. Kent State University, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[u]nder 
primary assumption of the risk, an individual assumes the inherent risks of 
the recreational activity and cannot recover for injuries unless another indi-
vidual acted recklessly or intentionally. The rationale is that certain risks are 
so inherent in some activities that the risk of injury is unavoidable.”33 Ange-
la Crace was a cheerleader who suffered serious injuries from a fall during a 
cheerleading practice.34 The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
 
 28. Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries, supra note 14, at 251 (footnote omitted). See 
also Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 34 (“In contrast, the new sport 
responsibility statutes impose obligations. Participants have an obligation to take care of 
themselves while providers also have responsibilities centered around the provision of safer 
activities.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 29. Horton, supra note 4, at 612. 
 30. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). See Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries, supra note 14, 
at 259–60 (“Determination of the application of primary assumption of risk is a ‘duty’ analy-
sis which precedes the negligence inquiry. A participant assumes the inherent risks of a rec-
reational activity by agreeing to voluntarily participate in that activity. A recreation provider 
has no duty to protect the participant from these risks, and ultimately, has no liability to the 
participant for injuries resulting from those risks.” (footnotes omitted)). See also CENTNER, 
AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 27 (“A third strategy prevalent in sport respon-
sibility statutes is to have participants assume risks related to a sport. Participants assume 
responsibility for injuries that are a part of the inherent danger of the sport. For example, a ski 
statute may provide that no skier may make any claim against any ski area operator for injury 
resulting from the inherent dangers of skiing.” Id. “Obvious risks that are associated with an 
activity are assumed by the participants. These risks are so directly associated with the activi-
ty that participants are responsible for related injuries. In some states, this acceptance of risk 
is known as primary assumption of risk. Under this doctrine, a provider offering an activity 
has no duty with respect to obvious and inherent risks. In the absence of a duty, there is no 
obligation to eliminate risk or to protect persons against injuries. Rather, risks that are part of 
the activity are assumed by the participants. Primary assumption of risk serves as a defense 
for businesses, recreational and sport providers, and property owners.” Id. at 79 (footnote 
omitted).”For accidents involving inherent risks, injured participants cannot blame others.” 
Id. at 134. “[T]o reduce some litigation, state legislatures have adopted laws to place respon-
sibilities for some sport accidents on participants.” Id. at 141)). 
 31. 924 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 
 32. 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003). 
 33. 924 N.E.2d at 909 (citations omitted). The court quoted Thompson v. McNeill: “Acts 
that would give rise to tort liability for negligence on a city street or in a backyard are not 
negligent in the context of a game where such an act is foreseeable and within the rules.” 53 
Ohio St. 3d 102, 104 (1990). 
 34. Crace, 924 N.E.2d at 908 (“Angela’s fall was unbroken and caused catastrophic 
injuries, including immediate paraplegia”). 
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properly applied the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk as a defense, 
and further held that Kent State University “owed no duty to protect [Ange-
la] from the inherent risk of injury related to a fall while participating in a 
mounted stunt or human pyramid. Based upon the claims presented in this 
matter, [she] may only recover if . . . [the cheerleading coach] acted reck-
lessly or intentionally.”35 In the final analysis, the Crace court held that the 
plaintiff suffered her injuries “in the recreational activity of cheerleading” 
and that her injuries were a result of “an inherent risk . . . that [was] incapa-
ble of being completely eliminated.”36 And because the trial court had found 
that the cheerleading coach had not acted either recklessly or intentionally, 
primary assumption of the risk barred the plaintiff’s claims.37 
The Supreme Court of California in Kahn v. East Side Union High 
School District38 articulated the rule similarly: “[S]ome risk of injury is in-
herent in most sports, and in order to avoid the detriment to a sport that 
would arise from discouraging participants from vigorously engaging in the 
activity, it is appropriate to hold that a participant breaches a duty of care to 
a coparticipant only if he or she ‘intentionally injures another player or en-
gages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the 
ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”39 The Ohio Supreme Court framed 
the rule in Marchetti v. Kalish,40 asserting that “[w]here individuals engage 
in recreational or sports activity, they assume the ordinary risks of the activi-
ty and cannot recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the other 
participant’s actions were either ‘reckless’ or ‘intentional’ . . . .”41 
The rationale for including risks “whether known or unknown” reflects 
the reasoning in Crace, wherein the court explained: “Under primary as-
sumption of the risk, the injured plaintiff’s subjective consent to and appre-
ciation for the inherent risks are immaterial to the analysis.”42 The Bill fol-
lows the Wyoming sport responsibility statute expressly stating that age is 
not a factor in determining whether a person assumes inherent risks.43 
 
 35. Id. at 914. 
 36. Id. at 915. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003). 
 39. Id. at 32 (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992)). See also 
CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE 179 (“Many sports are dangerous. Under the sport 
responsibility statutes, participants are obligated to accept responsibility for their own safe-
ty.”). 
 40. 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990). 
 41. Id. at 699. 
 42. 924 N.E.2d at 910. 
 43. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-121, 1-1-123 (West 2013). 
2013] PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 67 
III.  KEY DEFINITIONS 
A.  Sport or Recreational Activity 
1. A “sport or recreational activity” encompasses all commonly under-
stood sports and recreational and/or adventure activities of any kind, 
whether or not those activities include an instructional, educational, or 
competitive component, including but not limited to: alpine sports and/or 
activities (including skiing, ski-biking, and snowboarding), animal rid-
ing, animal training, archery, ballooning, backcountry trips, backpack-
ing, badminton, base jumping, baseball, basketball, biathlon, bicycling, 
billiards, bird-watching, boating activities, bowling, boxing, bungee 
jumping, camping, caving, challenge courses, cheerleading, cliff diving, 
climbing (including climbing observation towers, ice climbing, mountain 
climbing, and rock climbing, either indoors or outdoors on either natural 
or artificial surfaces), curling, cutting wood, dancing (including social, 
competitive, and fitness-related dance [e.g., jazzercise and Zumba], div-
ing, dude ranching, any equine activity and sports, exploring caves, ex-
treme sports, fishing, fitness training, football, geocaching, gliding, golf, 
gymnastics, hang gliding, harvesting the products of nature, hiking, 
hockey, horseback riding, horseshoe-pitching, hunting and gathering, ice 
skating, longboarding, martial arts, motorcycling, nature study, Nordic 
skiing, operating an all-terrain vehicle or utility terrain vehicle (including 
standard ATV’s and snowmobiles), outdoor education programs, paint-
ball, parachuting, participation in water or ski sports outside of designat-
ed areas, picnicking, ping pong, racing, racquetball, removing wood, riv-
er floating, rollerblading, roller skating, rugby, self-contained underwater 
breathing apparatus (SCUBA), sight-seeing, skating, sky diving, sleigh 
riding, sledding, snorkeling, snowboarding, snowmobiling, snowtubing, 
soccer, softball, spelunking, sport shooting, swimming, teambuilding ac-
tivities, tennis, throwing darts, track and field sports (including all run-
ning, jumping, and throwing events [e.g., pole vault, high jump, javelin, 
long jump, shot put, marathoning, etc.]), trapping, trekking, triathlon, 
weight training, ultimate Frisbee, volleyball, walking (including walking 
for fitness or nature walks), white water rafting, wrestling, windsurfing, 
yoga, zip-lining, and any other sport, game, or educational activity. 
The list of activities provided in § 1.1 is an illustrative list—not a limi-
tative or exhaustive list. Human history has provided an ever-expanding 
array of activities that we consider sport and/or recreational. 
The most common types of sport safety statutes are those which provide 
legislative protection for snow skiing, roller skating and equestrian activ-
ities. The list of protected activities, however, has expanded to include 
limitations on liability for activities as diverse as hang gliding, snowmo-
biling, and whitewater boating. Additionally, some states have enacted 
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legislative provisions that provide blanket protection to sport and or rec-
reational activities.
 44
 
According to Professor Centner, a number of the sport responsibility 
statutes enacted by states are designed to cover “risky sport activities.”45 
But, “[w]hile tennis and golf may have fewer injuries than horseback riding 
and skiing, it is not clear that such numbers should translate into different 
treatment for liability purposes.”46 In Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort,47 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
found no meaningful distinction to be drawn between sports that are 
‘commonly perceived’ to be ‘contact’ sports and those that are not. Ra-
ther, because we had previously recognized that ‘the risk of injury is a 
common and inherent aspect of informal sports activity[,]’ we saw no 
reason to adopt a framework that would utilize a different standard for 
different types of recreational endeavors.
48
 
Thus, the Bill is meant to encompass all such sports and activities, and 
is meant to apply to new sports and recreational activities as they develop 
whether known now or later introduced in the future as humans embrace 
new forms of sport and recreation. Unlike ski and equine liability statutes, 
many of which were enacted in response to specific lobbying groups, the 
Bill is intended to encompass as wide a variety of sports and recreation ac-
tivities as possible. Commentators have noted that a broader statute is likely 
to be preferable in a number of ways to the narrow ski and equestrian liabil-
ity statutes.49 
 
 44. Spengler & Burket, supra note 3, at 135. 
 45. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 40, at 19. See also CENTNER, 
AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 131 (“People seeking adventure will want to 
participate in activities despite risks of injury. What rules should our legislatures adopt to 
safeguard participants in dangerous sports? How should liability for injuries be assigned?”); 
Id at 144 (“Providers of risky sport activities have claimed that they need additional protec-
tion against some lawsuits to maintain viable business enterprises. Sport providers have 
found an answer through legislative dispensation: sport responsibility statutes.”). See gener-
ally Paul Caprara, Surf’s Up: The Implications of Tort Liability in the Unregulated Sport of 
Surfing, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 557 (2008) (examining the potential of applying primary as-
sumption of risk and other legal theories to the sport of surfing). One commentator has sug-
gested that primary assumption of risk may not fit well with certain exceptionally risky 
sports. Horton, supra note 4, at 604–05, 652–53(explaining a potential definition for extreme 
sports). 
 46. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 36. 
 47. 66 A.3d 1252 (N.J. 2013). 
 48. Id. at 1262 (citations omitted) (edit in original). 
 49. See, e.g., Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 4 (“Alternatively, 
a concise sport responsibility statute, as adopted in Wyoming, may delineate a way to reduce 
the number of statutes to simplify liability rules for risky recreational activities.”) (footnotes 
omitted). “Rather than proceed on a sport-by-sport basis, consideration might be given for all 
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Many sports and recreational activities that the Bill includes are rather 
obvious, such as the traditional sports of football, basketball, and baseball. 
Other sports, such as cheerleading, may be less traditional but nevertheless 
easily fit into the Bill’s definition. For example, in Crace, “the trial court 
held that ‘the risk of injury due to a fall while performing a mounted stunt is 
a result of a foreseeable, customary part of the sport of cheerleading.’”50 In 
its discussion of inherent risks included in the sport of cheerleading, the 
Crace court quoted a California case, Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified School 
District, remarking that “[w]henever gravity is at play with the human body, 
the risk of injury is inherent.”51 But many other recreational activities also 
are covered, such as hiking. For example, in Morgan v. Ohio Conference of 
the United Church of Christ, the plaintiff was a teacher who was serving as 
a chaperone for a sixth grade “Nature’s Classroom” hike at night.52 The 
Court of Appeals applied the Ohio common law of primary assumption of 
risk to him because it considered that hiking at night was a recreational ac-
tivity and that he was voluntarily engaging in it.53 Another Ohio case, Byer 
v. Lucas, helps to illustrate the breadth of activities that the Bill encom-
passes.54 Byer involved a hayride where a tractor pulled a wagon carrying 
partygoers.55 The Court of Appeals made it clear that, merely because the 
injury occurred as a result of a mishap involving a motor vehicle, the activi-
ty should, nevertheless, be considered a recreational activity.56 After discuss-
ing cases involving motorcycles, tubing behind a motor boat, snowmobiles, 
and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), the court summarized the case law as fol-
lows: “Clearly, courts have found that activities involving motor vehicles 
are recreational, and that activities can be recreational even when they occur 
on public roads.”57 
 
sport activities, as has occurred in Wyoming.” Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). See also 
CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 150 (“The piecemeal approach taken 
by states with separate provisions for different recreational and sport activities, including 
separate statutes for horses, has created a myriad of different rules. Distinctions among the 
provisions raise a number of issues. First, do some statutes show favoritism for special 
sports?”); Id. (“Additional efforts to aggregate statutory provisions for sport activities may be 
worthwhile for simplifying liability rules.”). 
 50. 924 N.E.2d 906, 912 (2009). 
 51. Id. at 913 (quoting Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified School Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 
802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 52. 2012 Ohio 453, 1. 
 53. Id. at 6. 
 54. 2009 Ohio 1022. 
 55. Id. at 1. 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
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B.  Inherent Risks 
2. “Inherent risks in a sport or recreational activity” are those 
risks which are characteristic of, derivative of, an integral part 
of, ordinary to, or intrinsic to any given sport or recreational 
activity, including but not limited to the judgment, decision-
making, conduct, ordinary carelessness (i.e., mere negli-
gence), and/or gross negligence (i.e., negligence below the 
level of culpability of recklessness) of any person as defined 
below in § 1.3 or provider as defined below in § 1.4. 
Commentators have recognized the critical importance of defining in-
herent risks in sports responsibility legislation: 
Sport safety statutes exist in most states to protect sport and recreation 
providers from liability. The theme of these laws is to place responsibil-
ity on participants for risks that they voluntarily assume. These risks are 
referred to as inherent risks and are often listed in the statute. Defining 
inherent risks has become a key aspect of many sport specific legislative 
initiatives.
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Section 1.2 encompasses a broad range of risks. The Supreme Court of 
California has explained: 
In the sports setting . . . conditions or conduct that otherwise might be 
viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself. Thus, 
although moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that might not 
exist were these configurations removed, the challenge and risks posed 
by the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort has no duty 
to eliminate them. (See generally Annot. (1987) 55 A.L.R.4th 632.) In 
this respect, the nature of a sport is highly relevant in defining the duty 
of care owed by the particular defendant.
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In the same case, the Supreme Court of California elaborated: 
In some situations, however, the careless conduct of others is treated as 
an “inherent risk” of a sport, thus barring recovery by the plaintiff. For 
example, numerous cases recognize that in a game of baseball, a player 
generally cannot recover if he or she is hit and injured by a carelessly 
thrown ball (see, e.g., Mann v. Nutrilite, Inc., (1995) 136 Cal.App.2d 
729, 734–735, 289 P.2d 282), and that in a game of basketball, recovery 
 
 58. Spengler & Burket, supra note 3, at 135. 
 59. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992). See also CENTNER, AMERICA’S 
BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 145 (“The meaning of inherent risks is critical for compre-
hending the immunity provided by sport responsibility statutes. A few statutes prescribe a 
general definition for multiple sports.”). 
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is not permitted for an injury caused by a carelessly extended elbow (see, 
e.g., Thomas v. Barlow (1927) 5 N.J.Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 ).
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In Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., the Ohio Supreme 
Court explained inherent risks, stating that “only those risks directly associ-
ated with the activity in question are within the scope of primary assumption 
of risk, so that no jury question would arise when an injury resulting from 
such a direct risk is at issue, meaning that no duty was owed by the defend-
ant to protect the plaintiff from that specific risk.”61 Explaining inherent 
risks as they relate to equestrian liability statutes, Professor Centner general-
izes that “‘[i]nherent risks’ are dangers or conditions that are an integral part 
of equestrian activities including animal behavior, unpredictability of reac-
tions, hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions, and collisions with 
other horses and objects.”62  
Some state statutes have attempted to enumerate inherent risks.63 As a 
rule, any such list is likely to fall short. No matter how comprehensive the 
drafters may try to be, misfortune and injury during sports and recreational 
activities are always finding new ways to manifest themselves.64 Conse-
quently, rather than listing specific inherent risks, the Bill takes the view 
that courts will be able to use reason and common sense to assess whether 
any given injury has been caused by a risk inherent in the sport or recrea-
tional activity in question.65 The Ohio courts refer to a risk as inherent if it is 
 
 60. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. 
 61. 659 N.E. 2d 1232, 1237 (Ohio 1996). 
 62. Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 50 
(footnote omitted). For another good, general discussion of equine liability statutes, see also 
Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 14–17. See also CENTNER, 
AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 26, 131. 
 63. See Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries, supra note 14, at 255 (discussing the 
Wyoming “judicial approach” and the efforts of other state legislatures to list inherent risks). 
See also Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 19 (“Inherent risks are 
defined in some statutes.”). 
 64. See, e.g., CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 145 (2008) (“For 
skiing, inherent risks may be defined as the risks of personal injury, death, or property dam-
age caused by variations in terrain, weather conditions, and persons. These include surface or 
subsurface snow, ice, bare spots, areas of thin cover, moguls, ruts, bumps, other persons 
using the facilities, rocks, forest growth, debris, branches, trees, roots, stumps or other natural 
objects or man-made objects that are incidental to the provision or maintenance of a ski fa-
cility. Participants assume responsibility for injuries by such conditions.”)(footnote omitted); 
id. (“Roller skating immunity statutes prescribe multiple approaches to reducing lawsuits 
against operators. In some statutes, skaters assume the inherent risks of roller skating. These 
would include injuries resulting from collisions (including collisions with columns, doors and 
benches), incidental contact with another skater or spectator, and falls.”)(footnote omitted). 
 65. As commentators have observed: “Inherent risk is a foundational legal concept for 
recreational sporting activities. The nature of the activity itself is a source of risk. Removal of 
risk from these types of activities is not usually an option for organizers, because the activity 
would be so fundamentally altered that it would no longer be recognizable as the same activi-
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foreseeable and customarily associated with any given sport or recreational 
activity.66 The Morgan court explained that “[t]he rationale behind the doc-
trine is that certain risks are so intrinsic in some activities that the risk of 
injury is unavoidable.”67 Specifically, in Morgan, the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “hiking contains an inherent risk 
of slipping, tripping or falling that cannot be eliminated, even more so with 
hiking at night.”68 The court did not need a statute attempting to enumerate a 
list of all of the potential inherent risks in hiking in order to reach its conclu-
sion.69 Judges are capable of determining what risks are inherent in any giv-
en sport or recreational activity on an ad hoc basis. 
Some inherent risks are obvious, such as ACL injuries caused by twist-
ing and/or contact in sports such as skiing, soccer, basketball, and football. 
Other inherent risks may be less obvious but nevertheless still “inherent.” 
For example, the Bill assumes that the negligence of coparticipants, coaches, 
officials, and providers is an inherent risk. Although some may find this 
confusing, it is a critical component of the Bill. In particular, risks such as 
those posed when a coach or an instructor challenges an athlete to attempt a 
more difficult or complex move are inherent risks. So long as the coach, 
official, or provider’s negligence is a mistake or an error of judgment that is 
neither reckless nor intentionally injurious, such mistakes are not actionable 
under the Bill.70 In Crace, the Court of Appeals of Ohio soberly noted that 
serious injuries may occur even when coaches adhere to accepted national 
regulations.71 Summarizing the testimony of the expert witnesses at trial, the 
court remarked: 
 
ty.” Beth A. Easter et al., Legal Issues Related to Adventure Racing, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS 
SPORT 253, 255 (2003). 
 66. See Morgan v. Ohio Conference of the Church of Christ, 2012 Ohio 453, 3 (Ohio Ct. 
App.) (“The types of risks inherent to an activity are those risks that are foreseeable and 
customary risks of the sport or recreational activity.”). See also CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME 
CULTURE, supra note 6, at 149 (2008) (“While sport responsibility statutes were intended to 
reduce litigation, sometimes they fail to accomplish this objective. If a legislature fails to 
adequately define inherent risks, an analysis of the facts may be necessary.”). 
 67. Morgan, 2012 Ohio 453, at 3 (citations omitted). 
 68. Morgan, 2012 Ohio 453, at 4 (citing the trial court). 
 69. Morgan, 2012 Ohio 453, at 5–6. 
 70. But see Thomas R. Hurst & James N. Knight, Coaches’ Liability for Athletes’ Inju-
ries and Deaths, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27 (2003) (considering certain kinds of coaching 
conduct such as forcing players to practice in extreme heat without proper rest and hydration 
that may be deemed reckless). See also Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A 
Guide to the Legal Liability of Coaches for a Sports Participant’s Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. 
SPORT L. 7, 43–52 (1996) (discussing the general rules regarding assumption of risk applied 
in cases). 
 71. Crace v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E. 2d 906, 913–14 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 
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[A]ccording to the experts, the risk of injury is inherent in cheerleading, 
particularly when performing elevated stunts and human pyramids. Even 
when a coach follows the AACCA safety guidelines, the risk is forever 
present and may only be reduced to manageable levels. Manageable risks 
are nevertheless risks. It necessarily follows that the risk of injury is in-
capable of being completely eliminated.
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Consider also a diving coach who suggests that a diver who has mas-
tered a single twist ought to attempt a one-and-a-half or double twist. Simi-
larly, a pole vault coach might challenge a vaulter to try a grip that is 4” to 
6” higher than the vaulter has used previously or to try a pole that is 5 lbs. or 
10 lbs. stiffer than the vaulter has used previously (or both). In these situa-
tions, if the diver or pole vaulter, in attempting to meet the coach’s chal-
lenge, is injured, that injury is the result of an inherent risk. Accommodating 
these circumstances is essential to the coach-athlete relationship. “Coaches 
must be free to push their players to levels that may, in hindsight, be beyond 
the students’ abilities.”73 The last thing that coaches need is a “Monday-
morning-quarterback”—a second-guessing of the coach’s challenge to her 
athlete. In the absence of the standard established by the Bill, if left to a ju-
ry, jurors might readily second-guess a coach’s judgment out of sympathy 
for an injured athlete, rather than a true assessment of fault. 
The Supreme Court of California examined this principle in Kahn v. 
East Side Union High School District: 
In the present case, we recognize that the relationship of a sports instruc-
tor or coach to a student or athlete is different from the relationship be-
tween coparticipants in a sport. But because a significant part of an in-
structor’s or coach’s role is to challenge or “push” a student or athlete to 
advance in his or her skill level and to undertake more difficult tasks, 
and because the fulfillment of such a role could be improperly chilled by 
too stringent a standard of potential legal liability, we conclude that the 
same general standard should apply in cases in which an instructor’s al-
leged liability rests primarily on a claim that he or she challenged the 
player to perform beyond his or her capacity or failed to provide ade-
quate instruction or supervision before directing or permitting a student 
to perform a particular maneuver that has resulted in injury to the stu-
dent. A sports instructor may be found to have breached a duty of care to 
a student or athlete only if the instructor intentionally injures the student 
or engages in conduct that is reckless in the sense that it is “totally out-
 
 72. Id. 
 73. West v. Sundown Little League of Stockton, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 4th 351, 360 (2002) 
(citation omitted). See also Hurst & Knight, supra note 70, at 39–41 (discussing cases that 
applied primary assumption of risk to officials). 
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side the range of the ordinary activity” . . . involved in teaching or coach-
ing the sport.
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In Kahn, the Supreme Court of California summarized the case law on 
this point: 
[T]he risks associated with learning a sport may themselves be inherent 
risks of the sport, and . . . an instructor or coach generally does not in-
crease the risk of harm inherent in learning the sport simply by urging 
the student to strive to excel or to reach a new level of competence. This 
line of cases analyzes and articulates an important and appropriate limi-
tation on the duty of a sports instructor. The cases point out that instruc-
tion in a sport frequently entails challenging or “pushing” a student to at-
tempt new or more difficult feats, and that “liability should not be im-
posed simply because an instructor asked the student to take action be-
yond what, with hindsight, is found to have been the student’s abilities.” 
[(Bushnell v. Japanese–American Religious & Cultural Center, 43 Cal. 
App. 4th 525 (Cal. App. Ct. 1996)).] As a general matter, although the 
nature of the sport and the relationship of the parties to it and to each 
other remain relevant, a student’s inability to meet an instructor’s legiti-
mate challenge is a risk that is inherent in learning a sport. To impose a 
duty to mitigate the inherent risks of learning a sport by refraining from 
challenging a student, as these cases explain, could have a chilling effect 
on the enterprise of teaching and learning skills that are necessary to the 
sport. At a competitive level, especially, this chilling effect is undesira-
ble.
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On the other hand, Byer v. Lucas illustrates a case where a court deter-
mined that the risks incurred by the plaintiff were outside the scope of those 
that could be deemed “inherent” in a recreational activity. As noted, Byer 
involved an accident that occurred during a hayride.76 Lori Byer was a pas-
senger riding in a wagon being pulled by a tractor. The hayride was orga-
nized as an activity at a social party. The tractor driver had consumed sever-
al beers prior to the hayride, attempted to descend a steep hill, and lost con-
trol of the vehicle. The irregular motion of the steep, out of control descent 
ejected Byer from the wagon, and she suffered severe injuries when she 
crashed to the ground. Although some risks are clearly inherent in a hayride, 
such as “getting scratched by tree braches [sic], being bounced around on 
the wagon, and even losing one’s balance and falling off the wagon, the 
court concluded that “it cannot be said the risks Byer encountered were an 
ordinary and foreseeable part of her hayride.”77 “[T]he recreational activity 
 
 74. 75 P.3d 30, 32–33 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 75. Id. at 40 (emphasis in original). 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
 77. Byer v. Lucas, 2009 Ohio 1022, 6, 5. 
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here entailed risks that extended well beyond the ordinary; risks not directly 
associated with a hayride.”78 More specifically, the court held that “a farm 
tractor and its wagon cascading down a steep hill out of control and jack-
knifing to a stop throwing passengers from it is not an inherent risk of a 
hayride. Therefore, the recreational activities/primary assumption of the risk 
doctrine is inapplicable and general negligence principles apply to Byer’s 
claim against Lucas.”79 
C.  Person 
3. A “person who takes part in a sport or recrea-
tional activity” includes, but is not limited to: par-
ticipants and co-participants, coaches, officials, 
spectators, caddies, team staff personnel, class-
mates, chaperones, competitors, drivers, facilities 
and/or field personnel, instructors, judges (whether 
on or off the field, ice, court, or other playing sur-
face or area), mentors, organizers, providers, ref-
erees, umpires, sponsors, students, teammates, 
team members, team personnel, team staff, train-
ers, pit crew, venue employees, personnel, volun-
teers, vendors, players or participants in sports and 
recreational activities listed in or within the scope 
of §1.1. 
The definition of “Person” anticipates that a “person” might be either a 
plaintiff or a defendant, depending on the facts of any given case. Partici-
pants and co-participants rather obviously are included. But the Bill pro-
vides a great deal of latitude in recognizing that a wide variety of others who 
are closely related to sports and recreational activities may also qualify as a 
“person” for purposes of the rule. For example, § 1.3 of the Bill contem-
plates that spectators, like participants, are included within the language of 
“A person, irrespective of his or her age, who takes part in a sport or recrea-
tional activity.” Cases from a number of jurisdictions have taken this ap-
proach.80 And “[i]n a few instances, sport responsibility statutes provide that 
 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 80. See Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 
61–62 (“In general, participants cannot recover damages from sport providers for injuries 
resulting from the sport’s inherent dangers and risks. In a few instances, sport responsibility 
statutes provide that spectators also assume inherent risks. When sport participants and spec-
tators assume the sport’s inherent risks, they cannot recover damages for these injuries from 
others.” (footnotes omitted)). See also Scott B. Kitei, Is the T-Shirt Cannon “Incidental to the 
Game” in Professional Athletics?, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 37, 40 (2004) (examining a variety of 
risks that spectators encounter, and considering whether such risks are inherent in sports). 
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spectators also assume inherent risks.”81 Officials, such as umpires, referees, 
and the like, are also considered participants in sporting events—integral in 
fact. Thus they easily come within the scope of this provision of the Bill.82 
And, in fact, an important case, Creel v. L & L, Inc., involved a golf offi-
cial’s conduct.83 
D.  Provider 
4. A “provider” includes but is not limited to both public and private: 
persons, individuals, organizations, clubs, schools, conferences, and cor-
porate entities that, for profit or otherwise, sponsor, organize, arrange, 
offer, provide a venue for, and/or conduct a sport or recreational activity. 
The definition of “provider” represents one kind of entity that might be 
a potential defendant in a lawsuit involving injuries incurred during sports 
and recreational activities. Section 6 and the definition in § 1.4 regarding a 
“provider” embrace the dictum noted in Crace wherein the court stated: “It 
is clear that courts generally extend primary assumption of the risk to relieve 
liability of owners, operators, and sponsors of recreational activities.”84 The 
court emphasized this point further, remarking that “courts have specifically 
held [that] ‘[n]on-participants involved in the game may be held to the same 
standard as participants.’”85 In addition, the court’s discussion noted that 
“the defendant’s classification as a participant, nonparticipant, coach, in-
structor, official, operator, owner, sponsor, provider, or otherwise” ought not 
 
 81. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 23 (footnote omitted). 
 82. See generally Eric T. Gilson, Sports Officiating and the Law: A Survey of Risks and 
Protections, 7 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 32, 33 (2009); Richard. J. Hunter, Jr., An “Insider’s” 
Guide to the Legal Liability of Sports Contest Officials, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 369 
(2005); Kenneth W. Biedzynski, Esq., Sports Officials Should Only Be Liable for Acts of 
Gross Negligence: Is That the Right Call?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 375 (1994) 
(concluding that recklessness ought to be the standard of liability applied to officials, not 
negligence). 
 83. 287 P.3d 729 (Wyo. 2012). For a discussion of Creel, see infra text accompanying 
notes 145–66. 
 84. Crace v. Kent State University, 924 N.E. 2d 906, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). See also 
Crace at 912 (“Similarly, the Twelfth Appellate District has expressly held: ‘[i]t is not logical 
to require “reckless” or “intentional” conduct for recovery against participants, yet allow 
recovery against non-participants based upon the lower standard of “negligence.”’ [Whitaker 
v. Walter B. Davis, 1997 WL 30552 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).] We agree with this holding 
when the injuries result from an inherent risk of the activity.”). And see also Crace, 924 
N.E.2d at 912 (“A holding to the contrary would likely shift the focus of the analysis away 
from the activity and its inherent risks. The analysis would then unnecessarily focus upon the 
extent of the defendant’s involvement and the defendant’s classification as a participant, 
nonparticipant, coach, instructor, official, operator, owner, sponsor, provider, or otherwise.”). 
 85. Id. at 911 (quoting Rodriquez v. O.C.C.H.A., 2000 Ohio 2560, 2 (Ohio Ct. App.) 
(citing Kline v. OID Associates, Inc., 80 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395–96)). 
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be the central focus in the doctrine of primary assumption of risk in a sports 
context.86 Rather the focus ought to be on whether the defendant’s conduct 
was reckless or intentional.87 Similarly, in Geurin v. Icepro, the California 
Court of Appeals remarked that the rule applies “to promoters and operators 
of sports activities, as well as participants.”88 
IV.  ASSUMPTION OF INHERENT RISKS AS PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
§ 3 Assumption of Risks Inherent in A Sport or Recreational Activi-
ty As “Primary Assumption of Risk” 
All assumption of inherent risks is “primary assumption of risk” which 
has the legal effect of negating duty for a sport or recreational activity. 
This negation of duty results from the nature of the sport or recreational 
activity and the parties’ relationship to it, because neither a provider nor 
a person who takes part in a sport or recreational activity owes a legal 
duty to protect other persons who take part in a sport or recreational ac-
tivity from the inherent risks of a sport or recreational activity. 
Section 3 of the Bill goes beyond the generalities of §2 and elaborates 
upon the mechanics of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk in greater 
detail. In particular, §3 explicitly explains the relationship between primary 
assumption of risk and duty, and implicitly recognizes the difference be-
tween primary assumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk. 
First, as regards the relationship between primary assumption of risk 
and duty, this section adopts the Supreme Court of California’s philosophy 
stated in Knight v. Jewett: “In cases involving ‘primary assumption of 
risk’—where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties’ relation-
ship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff 
from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury—the doctrine contin-
ues to operate as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.”89 Technically, 
the doctrine of primary assumption of risk operates to remove “duty” as an 
element from the standard negligence cause of action.90 As the Morgan court 
stated, “[t]he affirmative defense of primary assumption of the risk com-
pletely negates a negligence claim because the defendant owes no duty to 
protect the plaintiff against the inherent risks of the recreational activity in 
which the plaintiff engages.”91 
 
 86. Id. at 912. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 556, at *9 (Jan. 25, 2011). For additional discussion 
of Geurin, see infra text accompanying notes 140–44. 
 89. 834 P.2d 696, 707–08 (Cal. 1992). 
 90. See David Horton, supra note 4, at 613–15. 
 91. Morgan v. Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ, 2012 Ohio 453, 3 (cita-
tions omitted). 
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Another case that captures the essence of this aspect of the basic rule is 
Geurin v. Icepro.92 Invoking prior case law, the California Court of Appeal 
directly stated: “Under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, the defend-
ant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from particular harms arising from 
ordinary, or simple negligence. In a sports context, the doctrine bars liability 
because the plaintiff is said to have assumed the particular risks inherent in a 
sport by choosing to participate.”93 The Crace court emphasized the “no-
duty” aspect of this rule, stating, “primary assumption of the risk negates a 
negligence claim because no duty is owed to protect against the inherent 
risks of the recreational activity.”94 
As was mentioned, § 3 also recognizes the important distinction be-
tween primary assumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk. Cathe-
rine Hansen-Stamp has explained that courts have often encountered diffi-
culty in separating the two doctrines: “Courts continually muddled the in-
herent risk doctrine (primary assumption of risk) with secondary assumption 
of risk principles. In fact, the two legal doctrines require entirely different 
analyses.”95 In order to explain the distinction, Hansen-Stamp quoted the 
Vermont Supreme Court: 
Where primary assumption of risk exists, there is no liability to the plain-
tiff, because there is no negligence on the part of the defendant to begin 
with; the danger to plaintiff is not one which defendant is required to ex-
tinguish or warn about; having no duty to begin with, there is no breach 
of duty to constitute negligence.
96
 
As the court in Morgan noted, “With the doctrine of primary assump-
tion of the risk, the injured plaintiff’s subjective consent to and appreciation 
for the inherent risks of the recreational activity are immaterial to the analy-
sis.”97 The court went on to explain that primary assumption of risk serves as 
a complete bar to a plaintiff’s claim (whether or not the conduct is reasona-
 
 92. No. G042455, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 556. 
 93. Id. at *4–5 (emphasis original) (citations omitted). 
 94. Crace v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (citations 
omitted). 
 95. Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries, supra note 14, at 252. See also Caprara, supra 
note 45, at 567 (discussing the difference between primary and secondary assumption of 
risk); Easter et al., supra note 65, at 256 (“Assumption of risk defenses are categorized as 
primary or secondary assumption of risk or alternatively, as express or implied assumption of 
risk. Drago (2002) argues that these categories are often confused because the distinctions 
seem unclear.”); Horton, supra note 4, at 608–11, 615–20. 
 96. Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries, supra note 14, at 253 (quoting Sunday v. 
Stratton, 390 A.2d 398, 403 (Vt. 1978)). 
 97. Morgan v. Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ, 2012 Ohio 453, 3 (cita-
tions omitted). 
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ble or unreasonable), while secondary assumption of the risk is merged into 
the comparative fault system.98 
The California Supreme Court’s explanation of the difference between 
primary and secondary assumption of risk in Knight v. Jewett is helpful.99 In 
Knight, the plaintiff and defendant were on opposite sides in an informal 
game of touch football with a peewee football.100 Within ten minutes of the 
game, the defendant ran into the plaintiff during a play.101 The plaintiff then 
told the defendant to be careful and not so rough while playing.102 The plain-
tiff also claimed that she told the defendant that she would have to stop 
playing if he were to continue playing roughly (which the defendant did not 
recall).103 During the next play, the defendant jumped up to attempt to inter-
cept a pass and collided with the plaintiff which caused the injury at issue in 
this case.104 The plaintiff suffered injury to her finger as a result of the con-
tact.105 The plaintiff underwent three surgeries in an effort to alleviate the 
pain in her finger, but an unsuccessful result led to the amputation of her 
finger and the impetus for bringing suit.106 The plaintiff brought a claim for 
negligence and assault and battery.107 The defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment under the theory of primary assumption of the risk.108 
The Court analyzed assumption of risk and, in an extensive discussion, 
differentiated between primary assumption of risk and secondary assump-
tion of risk within the context of comparative fault.109 Primary assumption of 
risk is defined as “a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ . . . [for] the de-
fendant to protect the plaintiff from a . . . risk.”110 Secondary assumption of 
risk, on the other hand, is defined as the defendant having a “duty of care to 
the plaintiff[,] but the plaintiff knowingly encounters the risk . . . caused by 
the . . . breach of . . . duty.”111 The Knight Court explained the distinction 
between primary and secondary assumption of risk as follows: 
 
 98. Id. at 4–5. See also, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 600–01 (briefly considering the 
intersection of assumption of risk and contributory negligence). 
 99. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
 100. Id. at 697. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Knight, 834 P.2d at 697. 
 106. Id. at 698. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 704–11. 
 110. Id. at 703 (footnote omitted). 
 111. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703–05. See also CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra 
note 6, at 81 (“Secondary assumption of risk generally involves a breach of a duty not to 
increase the risks encountered by plaintiffs beyond the level inherent in the sport. Secondary 
assumption of risk also involves a breach of a duty of care by a defendant and additional facts 
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[T]he question whether the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the 
plaintiff from a particular risk of harm does not turn on the reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct, but rather on the na-
ture of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the re-
lationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport.
112
 
The court further defined primary assumption of risk more clearly as 
follows: 
In cases involving “primary assumption of risk”—where, by virtue of the 
nature of the activity and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the de-
fendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk 
of harm that caused the injury—the doctrine continues to operate as a 
complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.
113
 
V.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NON-INHERENT RISKS AND INTENTIONAL OR 
RECKLESS CONDUCT 
§ 4 Non-Inherent Risks Not Assumed in a Sport or Recreational Ac-
tivity 
A person (as defined in § 1.3) does not assume risks of injury caused ei-
ther by a provider of a sport or recreational activity or by a person (as de-
fined in §§ 1.3 and 1.4) which are not inherent (as defined in § 1.2). In-
tentional or reckless conduct of a person and/or provider (as defined in 
§§ 1.3 and 1.4) that is totally outside the range of ordinary activity in-
volved in a sport or recreational activity is not an inherent risk of a sport 
or recreational activity. 
A.  Intent & Recklessness in General 
Section 4 of the Bill adopts the legal standard of reckless or intentional 
conduct as explained in a number of cases that have considered the issue. 
For example, the court in Crace quoted the Ohio Supreme Court regarding 
the definition and interpretation of what constituted reckless conduct: 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has outlined the requisite analysis on this is-
sue. See Thompson v. McNeill, (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 
705: 
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if he 
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the 
 
suggesting that the plaintiff knew of the danger and decided to encounter the risk.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 112. 834 P.2d at 704. 
 113. Id. at 707. 
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other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead 
a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unrea-
sonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is sub-
stantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negli-
gent. * * * 
What constitutes an unreasonable risk under the circumstances of a 
sporting event must be delineated with reference to the way the particu-
lar game is played, i.e., the rules and customs that shape the participants’ 
ideas of foreseeable conduct in the course of a game. 
Id. at 105, 559 N.E.2d 705, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965), 587, Section 500.
114 
Another Ohio court, the Tenth Appellate District Court of Appeals of 
Ohio, has articulated the rule in a direct manner: “Under the doctrine of 
primary assumption of the risk, a plaintiff who voluntarily engages in a rec-
reational activity or sporting event assumes the inherent risks of that activity 
and cannot recover for injuries sustained in engaging in the activity unless 
the defendant acted recklessly or intentionally in causing the injuries.”115 
Section 4 also follows the California Supreme Court’s holding in 
Knight v. Jewett: “[L]iability properly may be imposed on a participant only 
when he or she intentionally injures another player or engages in reckless 
conduct that is totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in 
the sport.”116 The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently adopted this same 
common law standard in a case involving a fatality caused by a collision 
between a snowboarder and a skier.117 In that case, Angland v. Mountain 
Creek Resort, the court explained: 
Our conclusion that a recklessness standard is the appropriate one to ap-
ply in the sports context is founded on more than a concern for a court’s 
ability to discern adequately what constitutes reasonable conduct under 
the highly varied circumstances of informal sports activity. The height-
ened standard will more likely result in affixing liability for conduct that 
is clearly unreasonable and unacceptable from the perspective of those 
engaged in the sport yet leaving free from the supervision of the law the 
 
 114. Crace v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 914 (2009). 
 115. Morgan v. Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ, 2012 Ohio 453, 3 (cita-
tions omitted). 
 116. 834 P.2d at 710 (citing Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96–97 (Mass. 1989)). See 
generally Matthew G. Cole, No Blood No Foul: The Standard of Care in Texas Owed by 
Participants to One Another in Athletic Contests, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 438–39 (2007) 
(citing several egregious acts that most would agree were totally outside the range of ordinary 
conduct in sport). 
 117. Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 66 A.3d 1252, (N.J. 2013). 
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risk[-]laden conduct that is inherent in sports and more often than not as-
sumed to be “part of the game.”
118
 
Economic analysis of tort law suggests that “[b]ecause negligence re-
gimes should be both more lenient and more predictable, negligence may 
need to take the form not of ordinary negligence but of a laxer standard of 
care, such as gross negligence or recklessness.”119 The Second Restatement 
of Torts, comment f, explains the distinction between intentional conduct 
versus recklessness, while comment g explains the distinction between reck-
lessness and negligence. According to comment f, one hallmark of reckless-
ness is that a person knows or should know that “a strong probability that 
harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will 
prove harmless.”120 Comment g adds “that reckless misconduct requires a 
conscious choice of a course of action, either with the knowledge of the se-
rious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would 
disclose danger to any reasonable man.”121 And comment g also posits that 
the distinction between recklessness and negligence “is a difference in the 
degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount 
substantially to a difference in kind.”122 One commentator, in examining the 
economic underpinnings of immunity in general, insightfully notes: 
[N]egligence regimes will often need to take the form of gross negli-
gence or recklessness because such regimes have the characteristics of 
both minimum norms and more predictable norms. While the legal defi-
nitions of gross negligence and recklessness may be vague, they usually 
refer to acts that are very clearly inappropriate or, to put it differently, 
that all reasonable observers consider to be inappropriate. Absolute im-
munity for tort liability is desirable only when no such minimum norms 
can be defined.
123
 
Thus the Bill adopts the benchmark mental states of recklessness and 
intent to trigger liability.124 The Bill purposely avoids using the term “gross 
negligence” out of the concern that drawing a line between negligence ver-
 
 118. Id. at 1262 (quoting Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994)) (edit in origi-
nal). 
 119. Gerrit De Geest, Who Should Be Immune From Tort Liability?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 
291, 304 (2012). 
 120. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. f (1965). 
 121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1965). 
 122. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1965). 
 123. De Geest, supra note 119, at 293. 
 124. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 67 (“Activity providers who 
are reckless or willfully cause injuries need to pay for resulting damages.”). See also 
TERENCE J. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE: POINTING FINGERS AND SHUNNING 
RESTITUTION 134 (2008) (“Willful conduct needs to be so reckless or so charged with indif-
ference to the consequences as to be equivalent in spirit to actual intent.”). 
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sus gross negligence would simply be too fine a distinction to prove useful 
as a practical matter.125 In evaluating the efficacy of state sport responsibility 
laws that impose liability for gross negligence, Professor Centner remarks: 
“By retaining liability for gross negligence, the statutes may not be very 
significant in curtailing tort lawsuits.”126 “Statutes that adopt provisions 
granting immunity unless there was a willful and wanton disregard for the 
plaintiff’s safety are more likely to reduce litigation.”127 Hence, under the 
Bill, a plaintiff must present evidence of recklessness or intent in order to 
survive summary judgment.128 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey recog-
nized in Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort: “The heightened recklessness 
standard recognizes a commonsense distinction between excessively harm-
ful conduct and the more routine rough-and-tumble of sports that should 
occur freely on the playing fields and should not be second-guessed in 
courtrooms.”129 
In a case involving an ice hockey injury, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
explained that even intentional injuries may, in certain sports, be considered 
inherent.130 It is only when a defendant’s conduct ventures outside the 
boundaries of what is customarily expected in the sport that recklessly or 
intentionally causing injury can be considered non-inherent.131 In Karas v. 
Strevell, the Illinois Supreme Court explained: 
 
 125. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 97 (“Gross negligence in-
volves an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission was the result of actual 
conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of the person affected. It involves a 
subjective awareness of an extreme degree of risk.”). 
 126. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra at 4, at 28, 28 (“If an immunity stat-
ute only provides protection for qualifying negligent acts and retains liability for gross negli-
gence, as occurs in most Good Samaritan statutes, the statute may not preclude many law-
suits.” (footnote omitted)). 
 127. Id. at 30. 
 128. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 81 (“[P]articipants do not 
assume the risks of another’s reckless or intentional conduct. Nor do they assume the risks of 
a concealed or unreasonably increased risk.” (footnote omitted)); TERENCE J. CENTNER, 
AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE: POINTING FINGERS AND SHUNNING RESTITUTION 81 (2008) 
(“Whenever there is reckless or intentional conduct by another, the defense of primary as-
sumption of risk does not apply.”). 
 129. Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, 66 A.3d 1252 (N.J. 2013). 
 130. Though they are often used interchangeably, there is a distinction made between 
consent and assumption of risk. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort 
Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 519, 529 (1991). Consent—or, the assumption of the risk—is a defense 
to an intentional tort. The Restatement, however, treats this as the first element of a prima 
facie tort. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 cmt. b (1979) (The element is satisfied 
where the tortious actor “knows or believes that the consequence is certain, or substantially 
certain, to result from his act.”). When engaging in sports, like football or rugby for example, 
participants are attempting to intentionally hurt opposing players. 
 131. Karas v. Strevell, 884 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 2008). 
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Striking or bodychecking a person who is standing on two thin metal 
blades atop a sheet of ice is an inherently dangerous action. Even a 
cleanly executed body check, performed according to the rules of ice 
hockey, evinces a conscious disregard for the safety of the person being 
struck. Yet, in an ice hockey game where bodychecking is permitted, 
players are struck throughout the game. This conduct is an inherent, fun-
damental part of the sport.
132
 
The court recognized that “[i]n these sports, holding participants liable 
for consciously disregarding the safety of coparticipants is problematic,”133 
and examined the issue in a rather sophisticated and nuanced manner, ulti-
mately holding that “[i]n a full contact sport such as ice hockey or tackle 
football, a participant breaches a duty of care to a coparticipant only if the 
participant intentionally injures the coparticipant or engages in conduct ‘to-
tally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”134 
In part, the Karas Court relied on its own precedent, Pfister v. Shusta, 
which had created a contact sports exception that imposes liability on a par-
ticipant in the contact sport “only if a participant intentionally, or willfully 
and wantonly, injures a coparticipant. Stated differently, in a contact sport 
the duty owed by the participant to a fellow participant is the ‘duty to refrain 
from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct.’”135 In determining 
whether to hold organizational defendants liable for a participant’s injuries 
the Court reasoned: “Whether the contact sports exception applies to a non-
participant defendant is a policy determination that rests on the circumstanc-
es of the sport and its inherent risks, the relationship of the parties to the 
sport and to each other, and whether imposing broader liabilities on the de-
fendant ‘would harm the sport or cause it to be changed or abandoned.’”136 
B. Coaches, Instructors, and Negligence 
In addition, § 4 harmonizes with the rule stated in § 3 as it relates to 
coaches, instructors, teachers and others who are in a position to push or 
challenge athletes. As the Supreme Court of California explained: 
The instructor’s conduct was itself an inherent risk of the sport, the court 
found, and the instructor did nothing to increase that risk. “Instruction in 
an activity such as judo necessarily requires pushing a student to move 
more quickly, attempt a new move, or take some other action that the 
 
 132. Id. at 132. 
 133. Id. at 132. 
 134. Id. at 134 (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992)). 
 135. Id. at 130 (quoting Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Ill. 1995)). 
 136. Id. at 137 (quoting Kahn v. East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal. 
2003)). 
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student previously may not have attempted. That an instructor might ask 
a student to do more than the student can manage is an inherent risk of 
the activity. Absent evidence of recklessness, or other risk-increasing 
conduct, liability should not be imposed simply because an instructor 
asked the student to take action beyond what, with hindsight, is found to 
have been the student’s abilities. To hold otherwise would discourage in-
structors from requiring students to stretch, and thus to learn, and would 
have a generally deleterious effect on the sport as a whole.” (Bushnell [v. 
Japanese-American Religious & Cultural Center], 43 Cal. App. 4th 
[525, 532 (1996)] italics added.)
137
 
In Kane v. National Ski Patrol System, Inc., the court specifically rec-
ognized that “an instructor’s assessment errors—either in making the neces-
sary subjective judgment of skill level or the equally subjective judgment 
about the difficulty of the conditions—are in no way ‘outside the range of 
the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”138 A number of courts have 
expressly held that mere subjective judgment errors do not necessarily rise 
to the level of recklessness or intent. For example, in Morgan, the plaintiff 
alleged numerous facts regarding the provider’s decisions to lead a hike at 
night on a narrow trail, with limited visibility.139 The court, however, ruled 
that “[d]espite Morgan’s attempt to argue that the risks were heightened,” it 
concluded that given the facts, the “risks were inherent risks to night hik-
ing.”140 
Concurring in Kahn, Judge Werdegar also explained and clarified the 
principle and the policy that animates the principle: 
Instructors and coaches of active sports must, as an essential part of their 
jobs, encourage and direct students to learn new and more difficult ma-
neuvers and to perform already learned skills in more stringent competi-
tive circumstances, a learning process that carries inherent risks of phys-
ical injury. In learning active sports and in athletic competition the risk 
of injury is ever present; instructors must frequently exercise their indi-
vidual, subjective judgment in deciding whether a student is ready to at-
tempt a more dangerous skill or to face tougher competition; and when 
an injury occurs, especially an injury to a young person, the jury may be 
tempted to “second-guess [the] instructor’s assessment” (Kane v. Na-
tional Ski Patrol System, Inc.[,] 88 Cal. App. 4th 204, 214 [(2001)]). For 
these reasons, I agree with the majority that application of ordinary neg-
ligence standards to sports instruction threatens to severely chill both in-
 
 137. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 40. 
 138. 88 Cal. App. 4th 204, 214 (2001). 
 139. Morgan v. Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ, 2012 Ohio 453, 1. 
 140. Id. at 6. 
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stitutions’ maintenance of, and individual teachers’ participation in, such 
instructional programs.
141
 
Simply stated, this section of the Bill recognizes that, among other 
things, subjective errors of judgment may occur within the range of ordi-
nary, acceptable, prudent coaching, instructing, teaching, officiating, and the 
like, such as when a coach or official uses discretion to challenge an athlete 
to test or try more difficult moves or skills. Such subjective errors of judg-
ment are inherent risks within § 3 and not reckless or intentional within the 
scope of conduct in § 5.142 
VI.  INHERENT RISKS ARE A QUESTION OF LAW 
§ 5 Risks Inherent in a Sport or Recreational Activity: A Question of 
Law 
The determination of whether a risk is an inherent risk in a sport or rec-
reational activity, and consequently whether a duty is owed in a sport or 
recreational activity, is a question of law for the court, and therefore will 
generally be appropriate for resolution by a motion to dismiss, on sum-
mary judgment, and/or directed verdict. 
Section 5 follows the Supreme Court of California’s rule articulated in 
both Knight v. Jewett143 and Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dis-
trict144: “We emphasized that the question of ‘the existence and scope’ of the 
defendant’s duty is one of law to be decided by the court, not by a jury, and 
therefore it generally is ‘amenable to resolution by summary judgment.’”145 
The Ohio court framed the same rule in dictum in Crace: “As a procedural 
matter, we note that the case law regarding primary assumption of the risk 
generally consists of cases resolved upon summary judgment.”146 Ohio 
courts appear consistent on this issue.147 As recently as 2012, in Morgan v. 
Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ, the Court of Appeals suc-
cinctly stated that the decision “to apply the affirmative defense of primary 
 
 141. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 48 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
 142. For an extensive discussion of this principle, see Kahn, 75 P.3d at 40–43. 
 143. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
 144. 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003). 
 145. Kahn, 75 P.3d 30 (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 706). 
 146. Crace v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 912 (Ohio 2009). 
 147. See, e.g., Byer v. Lucas, 2009 Ohio 1022, 27 (“It is important to be mindful that 
‘[t]he application of the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk involves a basic determi-
nation as to whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. It is well established that 
the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide on a case-by-case basis.’”) 
(emphasis added by the Byer court) (quoting Wilson v. Lafferty Volunteer Fire Dep’t, No. 00 
BA 29, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5328, at *8–9 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2001) (citing Grover 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992))). 
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assumption of the risk presents an issue of law for the court to determine.” 
148 Professor Centner has bluntly asserted that “[i]f the reduction of litigation 
is important, then sport responsibility statutes need to provide that determi-
nation of an inherent risk is a question of law. In this manner, a court can 
grant summary judgment in qualifying cases without a trial.”149 Interesting-
ly, Hansen-Stamp takes the position that the Wyoming Recreation Safety 
Act was intended to embrace this philosophy. According to Hansen-Stamp: 
Although the Act’s sheer breadth of coverage gives it power and flexibil-
ity, it does require a strong and committed judiciary to apply it properly, 
within the context of appropriate cases. The original purpose of the Act 
was to codify that, as a matter of law, providers of recreational activities 
have no duty to protect participants from injuries resulting from the in-
herent risks of those activities. Presumably, defendant providers could 
bring motions to dismiss, or for summary judgment, arguing that the in-
jury resulted from an inherent risk, the provider owed no duty, and thus, 
the case should be dismissed.
150
 
Hansen-Stamp punctuates this point, noting, “[T]he judiciary’s deci-
sion to aggressively make this legal duty determination, where possible, will 
effectively minimize frivolous claims.”151 
Although sport responsibility statutes may be expected to reduce litiga-
tion and recovery against providers of enumerated sports, additional re-
duction of litigation costs may be possible. The question of whether an 
injury was a result of an inherent risk may be a question of law or a 
question of fact. If a sport responsibility statute is written so that inherent 
 
 148. 2012 Ohio 453, 2 (citing Crace v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ohio 
2009)). 
 149. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 151. But see Caprara, supra 
note 42, at 564 (mentioning courts that have treated this as a question of fact for a jury in the 
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 151. Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries, supra note 14, at 277. See also Centner, Ex-
panding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 4 (“Legislative responses that allow issues to be 
decided as a matter of law rather than a question for the trier of fact may help diminish litiga-
tion expenditures.” Id. at 4 (footnote omitted); “If a court finds that a jury decision is required 
to determine whether an injury resulted from an inherent risk under a specific statute, it may 
be possible to amend the statute so that future courts could decide as a matter of law that an 
injury was or was not the result of an inherent risk. In this manner, cases involving inherent 
risks would not require a jury trial and associated expenditures.” Id. at 35 (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
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risks are questions of law, the statute has the potential of reducing litiga-
tion expenditures.
152
 
The Bill does not attempt to enumerate duties owed by providers of 
sports and recreational activities. According to Professor Centner, “[m]ost 
sport responsibility statutes prescribe duties for sport providers.”153 On bal-
ance, this approach poses more problems than it solves. First, if the Bill 
were to list providers’ duties, it is possible that a court could later construe 
items on the list as creating new duties, and thus increase rather than de-
crease potential liability.154 And secondly the imposition of statutory duties 
of this nature may have a negative effect on the validity of express assump-
tion of risk by means of a liability waiver signed by plaintiffs. Nothing in 
the Bill is intended to alter or in any way diminish the effects, enforceabil-
ity, or validity of any type of express assumption of risk, including but not 
limited to a waiver of liability for negligence.155 
VII.  NO REQUIREMENT TO ELIMINATE, ALTER, OR CONTROL INHERENT 
RISKS 
§ 6 Neither a Person Nor Provider is Required to Eliminate, Alter, 
or Control Inherent Risks 
Neither a person nor provider is required to eliminate, alter, or control 
the inherent risks within a sport or recreational activity. 
Section 6 of the Bill simply adopts language from cases that have em-
phasized that this rule operates to remove any duty to eliminate, alter, or 
control inherent risks. It is likely that this goes without saying. Nevertheless, 
 
 152. Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 38. 
 153. Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 58 
(footnote omitted). 
 154. Centner, Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes, supra note 1, at 58–
59 (footnote omitted); Centner, Expanding Statutory Immunity, supra note 4, at 22 (“Because 
sport responsibility statutes enumerate duties for providers, they may increase liability due to 
specific duties set forth by the legislative grant.” (footnote omitted)). 
 155. See CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE, supra note 6, at 65–66 (“Many provid-
ers of recreational and sport activities have adults sign releases from liability for themselves 
and their children. They hope that these releases will protect them from prospective liability 
for injuries. Yet, most states prohibit releases that waive liability claims for children. Absent 
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Although this legal principle has been altered for a few exceptions, it applies to most parental 
releases. Other principles limit releases applicable to adults.”). For a brief discussion of lia-
bility waivers, see, e.g., Easter et. al., supra note 65, at 258–59; David Horton, Extreme 
Sports and Assumption of Risk: A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 599, 616-19 (2004). See also 
Horton, supra note 4, at 640–48 (discussing the validity of waivers signed by parents on 
behalf of their children, and discussing a variety of issues related to minors and assumption 
of risk in general). 
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this brief provision makes this principle clear. Interestingly, a number of 
courts have stated that a defendant owes a duty not to increase the plaintiff’s 
risk. This provision of the Bill is intended to avoid such an inquiry by ex-
pressly stating that there is no duty to control inherent risks. Framing an 
exception to primary assumption of risk as whether a defendant has in-
creased the plaintiff’s risk begs the question, or the very least asks the 
wrong question.156 Providers may increase inherent risks in a number of 
ways without necessarily acting with recklessness or intent. For example, in 
Geurin v. Icepro, the defendant, Icepro, failed to provide the regulation 
equipment, such as special shoes and helmets that the USA Broomball Reg-
ulations required for participants.157 One could certainly argue that failing to 
provide safety equipment required by the national rules constituted and in-
crease in risk to the plaintiff. And, in fact, the court stated that “Icepro . . . 
had no duty to protect Geurin [the plaintiff] unless it increased the risk that 
he would fall on the ice.”158 Nevertheless, the appellate court refused to find 
Icepro liable. Although the court posed the question as “whether Icepro in-
creased the risk of slipping on the ice,” it held that “IcePro had no duty to 
take actions that would make broomball safer, such as providing special 
equipment or instruction.”159 This was due, in part, to the fact that the game 
in question “was . . . a social, not a league game.”160 The court also rejected 
the plaintiff’s argument that Icepro should have resurfaced the ice before the 
match, reasoning that no one playing on ice is entitled to assume perfect 
conditions and that varying conditions of ice surface are included as part of 
the inherent risks.161 
At the opposite extreme, the Wyoming Supreme Court fell prey to this 
very problem. In Creel v. L & L, the Court engaged in the inquiry of wheth-
er the defendant’s employee increased the risk to the plaintiff when she in-
sisted that a tournament golfer hit from the tee even though the golfer had 
expressed a safety concern for the people on and around the green towards 
which he was hitting.162 Had the Crace court163 indulged in the same line of 
questioning and reasoning, it, no doubt, would have asked whether the 
coach’s negligence increased the risk to the defendant cheerleader, and 
 
 156. See Horton, supra note 4, at 629–33 (Horton sharply criticizes this concept, labeling 
it as “doctrinal disorder”). 
 157. No. G042455, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 556, at *2. According to the court, 
“Though USA Broomball regulations require commercially produced shoes with specially-
designed soft rubber soles and helmets, none were provided to any of the participants includ-
ing plaintiff. They were issued only brooms and a ball.” Id. 
 158. Id. at *7 (emphasis in original). 
 159. Id. at *6–7 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 160. Id. at *8 (footnote omitted). 
 161. Id. at *8. 
 162. 287 P.3d 729 (Wyo. 2012). 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 32–36, 46–47, and 77–79. 
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probably would have determined that factual questions remained that neces-
sitated a jury question. Such a result would be ludicrous, and would, like the 
Creel opinion, render the principle a nullity. 
In order to more fully appreciate the danger posed by the Creel case, it 
is worthwhile to consider that case in greater detail. This is a case that, if 
followed, has the potential to create an exception that swallows the rule.164 
The plaintiff, James Creel, was a spectator at the 2006 Wyoming Open, a 
golf tournament (held July 7, 2006), when he was struck on the head by a 
tee shot hit by a participant in the tournament.165 L & L was the company 
that operated both the golf course and the tournament.166 The plaintiff was 
standing near the first green, watching his son’s group putt.167 Kathy Irvine, 
a volunteer with 24 years of experience as a “starter” at this tournament, was 
serving as the starter on tee number one.168 Because of the importance of 
maintaining the tournament time schedule, she instructed a competitor (Brett 
Veesart) to hit from the number one tee, even though the foursome ahead 
(the foursome that James Creel was watching) was still on the green.169 That 
particular hole “is straight . . . [and] roughly 320 to 330 yards long.”170 
Veesart, a professional golfer, told Irvine that he was concerned that he 
might be capable of driving the green.171 Irvine expressed her doubts, and, 
using her authority as starter, instructed Veesart to hit his tee shot.172 In in-
terpreting the rule of primary assumption of risk, the trial court, citing prec-
edents from other jurisdictions, including New York, California, and Ha-
waii, stated that “there is a duty not to increase the inherent risks of a 
sport.”173 The trial court then apparently tried to make a connection between 
the concept of a duty not to increase inherent risks with the language of the 
Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, when it said: “These standards appear to 
be in accords with the WRSA, at least to the extent that an affirmative act 
that increases risk, is reckless or is an intentional tort is not necessarily ‘in-
trinsic to’ or ‘an integral part of’ most sports.”174 Apparently, the trial court 
understood that the “increase of risk” exception cannot logically apply to 
any trivial or even negligently caused increase of risk. Rather, as the trial 
court correctly stated, it is only if the defendant’s increase of risk amounts to 
recklessness or an intent to cause injury that the increase of risk by a de-
 
 164. Creel, 287 P.3d 729 (Wyo. 2012). 
 165. Id. at 731. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 730–31. 
 168. Id. at 731. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Creel, 287 P.3d at 730. 
 171. Id. at 731. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 732 (citations omitted). 
 174. Id. at 732 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-122(a)(i) (2009)). 
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fendant would be considered not to be an inherent risk. The trial court, 
therefore, quite logically, concluded: 
Ultimately, reasonable minds cannot differ that getting hit by an off-line 
or errant golf shot is an inherent risk of playing and watching golf. Mr. 
Creel assumed the risk of such an occurrence. [The defendants did not 
have] a duty to eliminate, alter or control that risk. As a result, summary 
judgment based on the undisputed facts is appropriate.
175
 
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court took a different approach, and 
interpreted the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act to permit an action for 
negligence in cases where a defendant’s negligent conduct was not an inher-
ent risk in the sport.176 This interpretation, of course, is at odds with those 
jurisdictions that consider a provider’s negligence, itself, as an inherent 
risk.177 A refusal to consider a provider’s negligence as an inherent risk is 
essentially opening Pandora’s Box, by allowing a jury to second-guess the 
defendant’s conduct. To make matters worse, the Court also expressed the 
opinion that “[t]he level of factual specificity required to establish an inher-
ent risk will often but not always preclude summary judgment on the duty 
question.”178 Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court here took the opposite 
viewpoint of California and Ohio where the judiciary treats the determina-
tion of whether a risk is inherent in any given sport or recreational activity 
as a question of law for the court, and, thus, precisely the type of determina-
tion that routinely ought to be resolved on summary judgment.179  Quoting a 
prior case that involved an injury caused when a saddle slipped and the rider 
fell from his horse, the Court remarked: 
Because under Wyoming law the question of what is an inherent risk is 
normally a question of fact for the jury, we do not attempt to set the pa-
rameters here as to what factual proof would take the risk of a slipping 
 
 175. Id. at 733. 
 176. Creel, 287 P.3d 729. 
 177. See supra Part IV.B. 
 178. Creel, 287 P.3d at 737. This view is completely at odds with the viewpoint of one of 
the authors of the Act, Catherine Hansen-Stamp, who, in remarking on amendments to the 
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 179. See supra Part VI. 
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saddle outside the realm of an inherent risk. We can only say that pre-
senting testimony that the saddle was not cinched tightly enough is not 
sufficient. As a result, this court agrees that there is no genuine dispute 
of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.
180
 
The Wyoming Supreme Court then took the argument to extremes. The 
Court acknowledged that “the evidence appears largely undisputed, that 
getting hit by a golf ball is, generally stated, an inherent risk of playing golf 
or being a spectator at a golf tournament.”181 Nevertheless, the Court unnec-
essarily complicated matters when it held that “[t]his statement of the inher-
ent risk is of limited usefulness, however, because it is abstract and presents 
the question in a vacuum without consideration of the specific facts of the 
case.”182 Actually, the Court simply missed the point. The point is that get-
ting hit by a golf ball while observing a golf match is an inherent risk of 
being a spectator at a live match. “The specific facts of the case” to which 
the court refers may well shed light on whether a defendant’s conduct was 
reckless or intentional, but specific additional facts ought not alter whether 
any given risk is characterized as “inherent.”  The Court tried to explain 
itself as follows: 
Under our required inherent risk analysis, the question we must answer 
is whether L & L did anything to increase the risk that Mr. Creel would 
be hit by a golf ball. That is, did the conduct of L & L’s agent, Kathy Ir-
vine, increase the risk beyond what everyone agrees would normally be 
an inherent risk. It is when the question is framed with this specificity 
that we find genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary 
judgment.
183
 
Actually the question should have been whether Irvine’s conduct was 
reckless or intentionally injurious. Framed in such a manner, the Court still 
may have decided that the issue ought to have gone to a jury. But a more 
appropriate result would have been to have assumed the facts as alleged in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff,184 and to have decided, as a matter 
 
 180. Creel, 287 P.3d at 738 (quoting Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 
(2000)). 
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2013] PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 93 
of law, whether sufficient facts had been alleged to reach the legal conclu-
sion that Irvine’s conduct was reckless or intentionally injurious. With all 
due respect, it is likely that her conduct was neither. But rather than taking 
this logical approach and straight forward application of the statute and the 
doctrine of primary assumption of risk, the Court instead sent the case back 
to trial holding: 
Based on the conflicting evidence and the reasonable inferences that can 
be fairly drawn from the record, we find genuine questions of material 
fact exist and the jury must resolve the duty question. That is, the jury 
must determine whether L & L’s agent, Kathy Irvine, increased the risk 
that James Creel would be struck by a golf ball, beyond the risk inherent 
in the sport, when she instructed Mr. Veesart to tee off when golfers and 
spectators were on and around the green and Mr. Veesart expressed con-
cern that he could hit the group ahead of him.
185
 
The dissenting Justice, Tyler, approached the problem in a manner sim-
ilar to that suggested by the Bill. He accused the majority of ignoring the 
legislative intent of the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act by “resorting to 
subtle and forced construction.”186 He contended that “the negligence excep-
tion under . . . [the statute] applies solely to ‘non-inherent risks.’”187 Accord-
ingly, he logically concluded: 
Inasmuch as the uncontroverted fact that being struck by a golf ball on a 
golf course during play at a professional golf tournament is an “inherent 
risk” assumed by a participant of a “sport or recreational opportunity,” 
the negligence exception in subsection (c) does not apply. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i), (iii) and § 1-1-123(c). To decide otherwise would 
effectively render the core purpose of the Recreation Safety Act a nulli-
ty.
188
 
In sum, Justice Tyler reasoned that L & L’s “motion for summary 
judgment made a sufficient prima facie showing that no genuine issue of 
 
inferences to be drawn from them were in dispute. Id. Nevertheless, if the Court had con-
strued these disputed facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there still seems little 
doubt that Irvine’s conduct still fell far short of recklessness or intentional injury. 
 185. Id. at 743. 
 186. Id. at 745 (Tyler, J., dissenting). 
 187. Creel, 287 P.3d at 745 (Tyler, J., dissenting). See also Hansen-Stamp, Recreational 
Injuries, supra note 14, at 272 (expressing the view that there is only a limited survival of 
claims for negligence claims under the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act: “If the judge deter-
mines otherwise, plaintiff may go on and attempt to prove that provider’s negligence (breach 
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 188. Creel, 287 P.3d at 745 (Tyler, J., dissenting). 
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material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a mat-
ter of law under the Recreation Safety Act. W.R.C.P. 56(c).”189 Certainly he 
is right. Unless Irvine’s conduct was reckless or intentionally injurious, the 
doctrine of primary assumption of risk precludes liability for such inherent 
risks. The language of § 6, namely that there is no duty to control inherent 
risks, is intended to avoid the kind of twisted logic evident in the Creel deci-
sion regarding a phantom duty not to increase inherent risks. At its core, this 
principle is the very same principle that acknowledges that subjective errors 
of judgment by a coach or instructor that fall short of recklessness or inten-
tionally injurious are inherent risks.190 
VIII.  NO POSITION REGARDING LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY 
EQUIPMENT OR PRODUCTS 
§ 7 Act Not Applicable to Equipment or Products 
This Act does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or 
manufacture of any sport or recreational equipment or other products 
used incidental to or required by a sport or recreational activity. 
Section 7 makes it clear that the Bill is not intended to address ques-
tions of liability relating to products and sports and recreational equipment. 
Although it is possible that it might be prudent to alter the rules of liability 
for cases involving equipment failure that causes injury, such legislation 
may have to await future consideration prompted by those who manufacture 
and sell such products and equipment. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Participants in sports and recreational activities suffer injuries. The risk 
of injury is inherent in sports and recreational activities. Of course the prob-
ability and severity of the risks of injury vary depending on the sport. Foot-
ball, ice hockey, skiing, whitewater rafting, horseback riding, automobile 
racing, and rugby are, generally speaking, more dangerous than curling. And 
when high-profile athletes and events are involved, the modern media makes 
certain that the public hears about it. A 30-day window of time in early 2013 
serves as an example of just how dangerous sports and recreational activities 
can be. On January 24, 2013 Caleb Moore, one of the world’s most prolific 
snowmobiliers died in Aspen, Colorado after his snowmobile flipped and 
 
 189. Id. (Tyler, J., dissenting). 
 190. See supra Part VI.B. 
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rolled over him during a competition.191 On February 5, 2013 Olympic Gold 
Medal skier Lindsay Vonn tore her ACL, MCL, and suffered a fractured 
tibia while competing in the Super-G in Austria.192 And on February 23, 
2013 a 12-car crash at the Daytona Motor Speedway in Florida sent Kyle 
Larsen’s racecar into the spectator seating area, injuring 28 spectators.193 
At first blush one may worry that the legal rule created by the Bill 
might result in insurers increasing premiums for first-party medical insur-
ance. But this ought not be the case. By significantly decreasing the volume 
of litigation, insurers will have far fewer lawsuits to defend. Consequently, 
the legal fees of insurers will be reduced (e.g., fees for outside counsel, pri-
vate investigators, and expert witnesses).194 This in turn will result in a net 
decrease in costs to insurers because they will pay far less in litigation costs. 
By appreciably reducing litigation costs, insurers will realize an aggregate, 
cumulative financial gain.195 Thus, there will be no need for insurers to in-
crease premiums for first-party medical insurance. “We can revise our legal 
system to do a better job of precluding persons from bringing lawsuits con-
cerning accidents where they should assume the risks of injury.”196 The win-
ners will be the insurers and those who participate in sports and recreational 
activities.197 The losers will be the plaintiffs’ bar, private investigators, and 
expert witnesses.198 In terms of fundamental fairness, this result is one that 
society as a whole can support. 
Professor Centner poses the problem directly: 
Thus, the challenge is to draft legislation incorporating responsibilities 
for participants. Because our common law has digressed so far in man-
dating accident deterrence by owners of property, a corrective measure is 
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needed to shift responsibilities back to users. Persons participating in 
sports, engaging in recreation, or using property of another should as-
sume some responsibility for their own well-being. They need to assume 
risks that accompany their choices of engaging in life’s activities.
199
 
Thus state legislators, in passing the Bill, have an opportunity to im-
prove sports and recreation in a number of ways. The financial benefits are 
important. But the benefits to the individuals who wish to exercise and exer-
cise their freedom to participate in sports and recreational activities are even 
greater. 
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